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TWO CHEERS FOR THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES:  




On January 1, 2012, a new constitution took effect in Hungary.  That 
document, known as the country’s “Fundamental Law,” establishes that 
“[t]he provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance 
with . . . the Fundamental Law’s National Avowal of Faith.”1  This 
language means that, as a matter of law, Hungary’s constitution is to be 
interpreted according to the principles of Christianity.  The Constitution of 
the United States lacks any comparable interpretive commitment, of course.  
Indeed, as John Witte, Jr. has observed:  “A reference to ‘the Year of our 
Lord’ sneaks into the dating of the instrument.  But nothing more.  The 
‘Godless Constitution’ has been both celebrated and lamented ever since.”2  
One hears no lamentation from Lee Strang about the U.S. Constitution, 
neither in his previous writings on the subject nor in his recent piece 
published in the Fordham Law Review.3  Indeed, Strang is among the many 
who celebrate that document.  Elsewhere, Strang has defended the 
Constitution, and specifically its original public meaning, on the ground 
that it leads to “human flourishing.”4
Not only is the U.S. Constitution silent about God and His place in the 
document’s interpretation, it maintains a complete silence on the question 
of how it is to be interpreted, with the exception of the purposes set out in 
the Preamble, now long neglected.  More than two hundred years of 
constitutional argument have established that text, constitutional structure, 
purposes, original intent, original meaning, judicial precedent, settled 
  Some other constitutions do that as 
well, we must assume.  Some lead even higher. 
 
*  John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Villanova University School of Law.  I am grateful to the editors of the 
Fordham Law Review for their welcome invitation to reply to Professor Lee Strang’s article. 
 1. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
HUNGARY], available at http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/alternative_translation_of_the_draft.
constitution.pdf. 
 2. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 76 
(2005). 
 3. Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition:  Virtue’s Home in 
Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997 (2012). 
 4. See Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions 
Within Constitutional Interpretation:  Originalism Grounded in the Central Western 
Philosophical Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 917 (2005). 
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expectations, the developing traditions of the American people, and even 
contemporary morality are among the legitimate bases of such argument.5
This argument to reduce the list of legitimate modalities is itself a 
legitimate form of constitutional argument.
  
Over the last several decades, however, some Americans—most of them 
self-styled conservatives—have engaged in an aggressive march drastically 
to shorten the list of legitimate modalities of constitutional interpretation.  
Strang is among those who prefer the family of theories known as 
“originalism,” to the exclusion of others. 
6  But, as H. Jefferson Powell 
has argued, such argument “ought to be recognized for what it is, a proposal 
for radical reform.”7
As noted above, Strang has pressed for such reform on the ground that 
originalism
  One need not be conservative by temperament or 
conviction to demand good and sufficient reasons for proposals for radical 
reform. 
8 best facilitates human flourishing.9  To that argument Strang 
now adds another:  virtue, which facilitates human flourishing, also 
facilitates originalism.10  Common sense alone probably suggests that a 
virtuous originalist interpreter will do originalism better than an originalist 
who lacks virtue (that is, is vicious).  But is virtue so parsimonious or 
partisan as to lead uniquely, strongly, or even much at all in the direction of 
originalism?  Surely virtue facilitates, and in turn is facilitated by, at least 
some other modalities of constitutional interpretation as well.11  What I will 
argue here is that those who share Strang’s commitments to the account of 
law received from what he refers to as the “central Western tradition,”12 
above all in the learning of St. Thomas Aquinas and his faithful expositors, 
should (1) reject original public meaning originalism, (2) embrace some 
version of original intent originalism,13
 
 5. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS:  THE CONSTITUTION IN 
HISTORY AND POLITICS 208 (2002). 
 but (3) defend the original intent 
meaning of the Constitution only with important reservations and on certain 
 6. Id. at 209. 
 7. Id.; see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13–25 
(2001) (arguing that originalism fails as a theory of constitutional interpretation because it 
does not remotely approximate current practice); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All 
Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 59 (2011) (“Originalists don’t argue that the linguistic meaning 
should be the original public meaning; they argue that the original public meaning is the 
linguistic meaning—the use of the word should in this context would be misleading or 
wrong.”). 
 8. From this point on, all references to “originalism” are to original public meaning 
originalism unless another form of originalism is indicated. 
 9. See Strang, supra note 4, at 917. 
 10. See Strang, supra note 3. 
 11. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE:  THE MORAL DIMENSION 
OF JUDICIAL DECISION 99–109 (2008). 
 12. Strang, supra note 4, at 916, 936. 
 13. I say “some version” because my argument does not require me to defend one 
version in particular, and space limitations do not allow me to compare the merits of the 
different versions. Cf. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION:  A 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 17–65 (1992) (comparing different forms of originalism). 
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conditions.  I remain, for all that, a genuine but qualified supporter of our 
Constitution.  Two cheers, but not three. 
I.  THE CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF ORIGINALISM 
Strang is correct in pointing out that theorists of law have been slow to 
absorb the insights of the virtue-theoretic work that has enjoyed a revival 
since Elizabeth Anscombe published her bombshell essay Modern Moral 
Philosophy in 1958 and, even more, since Alasdair MacIntyre published 
After Virtue in 1981.14  Arete is the Greek word for virtue, and Strang is in 
good and growing company when he insists that it is time (to borrow a 
phrase from Larry Solum and Colin Farrelly) to take an “aretaic turn” in 
jurisprudence.15  Even if one remains unconvinced by some of the claims 
advanced by the virtue theorists, there is much to be grateful for in any 
number of their insights.  Virtues are habitual states of character, and it 
would be silly not to draw the implications of the fact that a person’s 
character conditions what he is capable of doing or forbearing, including in 
law.  It would be difficult, therefore, to disagree with Strang’s claim that 
“virtue . . . facilitates originalism”16
Strang asks whether virtue facilitates originalism.  A more hopeful 
question is this:  To which interpretive modality or modalities does a 
comprehensive appreciation of virtue lead?  Or to put a slightly different 
point, Strang seems to have his ordo operationum backwards.  He starts 
with originalism as his bulwark and then asks originalism to “incorporate[] 
virtue ethics’ insights.”
—unless, of course, the original public 
meaning of the Constitution is committed to practices or states of affairs 
that are inconsistent with, or inadequate to, the goods of human flourishing 
to which true virtues lead.  If the latter consequence were actual, virtue 
would be obligated to criticize originalism. 
17
To be sure, as mentioned above, Strang has elsewhere made the case for 
originalism from the ground up.  My current point is that the and-the-
kitchen-sink-too advocacy of a designedly countercultural interpretation of 
the Constitution merits remark.  “[W]hen literate cultures are in crisis,” as 
many conservatives believe ours to be, “the crisis is most evident in the 
question of what they do with their exemplary written texts.”
  One understands why he does so, but does it not 
make better sense to ask what virtue—or, better, a fully adequate account of 
human morality—counsels in terms of law and interpretive methods?  The 
answer might be originalism, or it might not be. 
18
 
 14. See Strang, supra note 
  Attempting 
to make the original public meaning of the Constitution the last word is one 
strategy in the culture wars as they bleed into and colonize law, and I 
concede that the attempt is not without at least some appeal.  The Framers 
3, at 2002, 2015 n.129. 
 15. Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of Law, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 1, 3 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008). 
 16. Strang, supra note 3, at 2028. 
 17. Id. at 2031. 
 18. DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY:  HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 11 
(1987). 
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and Ratifiers mercifully did not profess “the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”19  Dependent rational animals, which is what we are given to 
be, do not invent themselves.20
The point I wish to press, however, is that originalism—whatever its 
assistance to social conservatives locked in culture wars—exacts an 
impossible price by corrupting and falsifying our thinking about the deep 
metaphysical question of what it is to make and live by law.  If this worry 
about where Strang’s and others’ original public meaning originalism leads 
should strike the reader as exaggerated, consider the implications of a claim 
Strang makes quite innocently. 
 
Before introducing that claim, a little background is needed.  As Strang 
points out, contemporary virtue theory is not all of one piece.  Instead, 
“[v]irtue theorists tend to fall into two distinct but related camps,”21 he 
explains.  “One group is composed of Neo-Aristotelians who focus on 
Aristotle to the not-complete exclusion of later, religious interpreters of 
Aristotle, such as St. Thomas Aquinas.  The other group of scholars 
attempts to utilize Aristotle and his (primarily) Christian followers, 
especially St. Thomas Aquinas.”22  Strang counts himself in the latter 
school of thought.  According to that school, all humans are under a 
divinely given natural law, the first precept of which is that “ good is to be 
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”23
 The moral virtues ensure that one’s appetites for goods are properly 
ordered by one’s reason. . . .  [B]oth virtue and natural law are tools that 
facilitate one’s pursuit of happiness. 
  Humans, then, are under a 
divine mandate to pursue the goods that constitute human flourishing, and, 
on this account, the virtues turn out to be instrumental states of character 
that facilitate the identification and instantiation of those goods.  And it is in 
this context that Strang makes the claim to which I have just provided the 
background: 
 This Article explains how originalism and the judicial virtues have an 
analogous relationship . . . .  The Constitution’s original meaning plays a 
role parallel to natural law because it contains the external positive 
norms that direct judges toward our society’s common good.24
 
 19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 
 20. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS:  WHY 
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (1999). 
 21. Strang, supra note 3, at 2017 n.152. 
 22. Id. 
 23. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I–II, Q. 94, art. 2 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947).  On the tension between the 
subjects of natural law and virtue, see Russell Hittinger, Natural Law and Virtue:  Theories 
at Cross Purposes, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:  CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 42 (Robert P. 
George ed., 1992). 
 24. Strang, supra note 3, at 2024 (emphasis added). 
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A first response to the italicized assertion is that “[e]very tribe needs its 
totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours.”25
A second response begins by appreciating that the natural law, unlike 
even the best human law, is inexhaustible:  the natural law is, as Strang 
himself stipulates (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas), “the rational creature’s 
participation of the eternal law.”
 
26  The natural law, in other words, is 
exactly the Divine Mind sweetly disposing all things to their ends.  On the 
account Strang adopts, the natural law is nothing less than a sharing in the 
Divine Mind.  In light of this, I will be so bold as to assert that the 
Constitution, whatever that document’s merits, is not profitably compared 
to a sharing in the Divine Mind.  The natural law is binding because God 
imposes it upon us.  The Constitution binds, however, only insofar as its 
contents are derived from the natural law.27
One of the usual (and understandable) boasts on behalf of our 
Constitution concerns the modesty of its ambitions.  There are endless 
issues on which our Constitution has “very few ideas to contribute.”
  The verb that Strang uses to 
liken the Constitution to the natural law, “parallels,” obscures the essential 
question:  does the Constitution give effect to the natural law such that the 
Constitution is valid law?  Strang begs the necessary question.  One can 
imagine many a document bearing the label “constitution” that is not 
worthy of enforcement because it does not meet the conditions of what it is 
to be law. 
28  Not 
so the Divine Mind.  Our Constitution, moreover, says very little, even on a 
generous estimate, about the contents of “our society’s common good.”  
The Constitution mostly confines itself to the allocation of powers, to the 
specification of procedures, and to the conferral of certain rights, above all 
those mentioned in the first eight Amendments.  When the Constitution’s 
authoritative interpreters cause it to accomplish more, they tend to do so 
abashedly, usually under the apparent oxymoron “substantive due process.”  
The natural law, by contrast, is unabashedly all about substance (which of 
course includes proper procedure, including government under law).  It is 
devoutly to be hoped that legislators, judges, and citizens will make their 
respective contributions to our society’s common good.  What exactly in 
our Constitution “direct[s] judges toward our society’s common good”29 is 
not, however, a question Strang answers.  The central Western tradition 
holds that the common good of any polity includes distributive justice, but I 
believe that the Constitution remains silent on that question.30
 
 25. Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937), 
quoted in Henry Paul Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353 
(1981). 
  Justice is 
 26. Strang, supra note 3, at 2023 n.219. 
 27. “[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the 
law of nature.” AQUINAS, supra note 23, at I–II, Q. 95, art. 2. 
 28. Gerhard Casper, Guardians of the Constitution, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 779 (1980), 
quoted in Monaghan, supra note 25, at 396. 
 29. Strang, supra note 3, at 2024. 
 30. On the cardinal virtue of justice, see JOSEF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES 
43–113 (1966).  Addressing the demands of achieving distributive justice, Pieper writes:  “If 
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one of the four cardinal virtues, yet the Constitution says not a word about 
it.  And that is not the greatest of the Constitution’s omissions, a point to 
which I shall return in Part III. 
II.  ORIGINALISM’S ORIGINAL SIN:  THE SUPPRESSION OF THE LAWGIVER 
Attempting to fortify originalism with insights culled from the central 
Western tradition remains one possibility.  Another is to ask what that 
tradition teaches about the very conditions of law, lawmaking, and the civil 
authority’s role in ordaining the people to their common good.  The answers 
to the latter lines of inquiry lend support to some of the boasts on behalf of 
the originalism for which Strang presses, but not to others.  The differences, 
I suggest, should be dispositive. 
In our contemporary culture, law and lawmaking are saddled with 
regrettably degraded connotations and associations.  I dare say that the 
arbitrariness with which some have blatantly concocted one version of 
“originalism” after another in order to score points in the culture wars 
would be among many contributing causes.  In this respect, at least, 
Strang’s attempt to root originalism in something larger than itself and more 
enduring than a battle station in cultural cross-fighting is a welcome 
development.  But law deserves better, and not just because I say so:  it is a 
matter of the metaphysics of the thing. 
The same culture that suspects the Supreme Court of committing politics 
veiled only by a gossamer mantilla of law nourishes an even deeper 
reservation, one that goes to the very possibility of law as such.  To be 
under law at all is to be ruled and measured, yet what Lawrence v. Texas31 
declares in derogation from that truth is that what we are is “plastic and 
revisable selves.”32
An alternative view, and the one associated with the natural law tradition, 
is that lawmaking—the authoritative ordering of a multitude to the common 
good—is almost as good as it gets.  Only “almost” because love precedes 
law, generates law, and surpasses law.  But that love that precedes and 
surpasses law does indeed lead to law, as the divine exemplar demonstrates.  
The God who loved us into being also then legislated for us, and He would 
  Lawrence here is both cause and, even more, 
consequence of the culture that denies that there is a stable human nature on 
which government and law can act.  Selves that are supposedly malleable 
without limit cannot coherently suffer any serious notion of law that orders 
to the (common) good exactly by being ruled and measured by a higher 
law.  Such “selves” as Lawrence imagines enjoy ample license to deny that 
the state can possibly legislate for them (apart from deterring or punishing 
crude violations of the Millean harm principle, a limit the arbitrariness of 
which is ignored). 
 
political life is to regain its dignity, a proper appreciation of the eminence of the ruler’s task 
and of the lofty human qualities required for it must be revived in the mind of the public.” Id. 
at 92. 
 31. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 32. Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 429, 492 (1990). 
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not have had it any other way.  When He gave us the keys to the car, He 
also gave us obligatory directions (and further noted the calamitous 
consequences that befall those who ignore the directions).  He 
authoritatively ordered a multitude (us) to their (our) common good.  Thus 
God.  But not only God:  humans who do as much—that is, authoritatively 
order a multitude to its common good—make law.  What is being claimed 
should not sail by unnoticed:  “Legislation is the epitome of participation in 
the eternal law, for it is in issuing the ordering-judgment that we are most 
imitative of God, who spoke such a word to his creation.”33
The Constitution is not legislation, of course, at least not in the sense we 
ordinarily speak of legislation.  It is, nonetheless, “an ordering-judgment” 
authoritatively addressed to the entire body politic.  But does it, in fact, 
order to the “common good?”  The answer depends, in part, on how that 
document gets interpreted.  My point is that the question of how to interpret 
that ordering-judgment necessarily raises, even if the issue is not usually 
articulated quite this way, the question of how to treat this particular human 
artifact such that it can potentially rise to the level of law in imitation of the 
divine ordering-judgment to the common good of this particular multitude.  
Not everything that calls itself law is in fact law.  Claiming that the 
Constitution “parallels” the natural law hardly helps here.  There will be 
lots of rejects and pretenders in the contest to be law, and it is at least 
conceivable that the Constitution would be among those that do not make 
the grade.  When a court concludes that there was no rational basis for a 
statute, it is in effect concluding that what emerged from bicameralism and 
presentment is not truly a law.  Law is a thing of reason, and a statute’s not 
having a basis in reason renders it non-law.  Similarly, rolling dice would 
not settle, say, the contents of “due process of law.”  Chance is not a 
potentially legitimate modality of constitutional interpretation. 
 
But what, then, about the original public meaning of the Constitution?  I 
am not convinced that it delivers what the central Western tradition means 
by law for a number of reasons.  I have space enough to mention only three 
(two of which also afflict, in differing degrees, the original intent meaning 
of the Constitution). 
I can get at the first with the help of one of Larry Solum’s arguments 
defending original public meaning originalism against those other 
originalists who would insist instead on the authors’ intentions.34  Solum 
makes the case for original public meaning by likening it to “a message in a 
bottle.”35
 We get “messages in a bottle” all the time.  Almost every day, we read 
scraps of text that are detached from their authors.  You see a flyer on the 
bulletin board of a coffeehouse.  You read a memo from someone you 
  He explains: 
 
 33. RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE:  REDISCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A 
POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 100 (2003). 
 34. Solum, supra note 7, at 13–16. 
 35. Id. at 14. 
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don’t know who does a job that you’ve never heard of.  You read a 
quotation from a post on a blog that you’ve never read before.36
And from these examples he draws the following conclusion:  “When 
you read texts like these, your ability to comprehend their meaning depends 
on the conventional semantic meanings (the public meanings) of the words 
and phrases (the units of meaning) and the regularities of usage that we 
describe as the rules of syntax and grammar of English.”
 
37  I do not 
disagree, but I do deny that what Solum says next is necessarily true:  
“Writing a constitution is like putting a message in a bottle.”38
What this account submerges, however, is something that is central to the 
account of natural law to which Strang, like me, claims fealty.  To be under 
law is to be ruled and measured.  To read and comprehend scraps of texts, 
flyers, and memos is not to be ruled and measured; it is, perhaps, to be 
informed.  To be ruled and measured by law is more than to be informed; it 
is, as noted above, to be ordered toward the common good, and specifically 
by the one who has authoritative care of the community.
  It could be, 
as demonstrated by the fact that courts look to and give legal effect to the 
original public meaning of the Constitution all the time.  The fact proves the 
possibility. 
39  Treating the 
Constitution like a message in a bottle eviscerates the ruling authority’s 
ability to rule through law.40
The point I am defending can be summarized this way:  there is no law 
without a lawgiver.  To be sure, there is an account of natural law that 
denies this proposition, and it has been ably defended by John Finnis and 
Robert George, among others.
 
41  Strang, however, explicitly claims to 
“utilize the understanding of natural law as posited by God,”42
 
 36. Id. at 15. 
 and on that 
account the eternal law, of which (as noted above) the natural law is our 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Ronald A. Parsons, That Which Governs:  An Essay on the Nature of Law and 
Its Relation to Justice, 43 S.D. L. REV. 172, 173 (1998) (“What, then, does law do?  Law 
governs.  It necessarily binds . . . .”); see also Russell Hittinger, Aquinas and the Rule of 
Law, in THE EVER-ILLUMINATING WISDOM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 99, 108 (1999) (“No 
human being makes rules or laws from scratch, because no human mind is a rule or law unto 
itself.  For God, nature and law are the same; but for the creature, there is no such thing, 
strictly speaking, as autonomy.”). 
 40. See Russell Hittinger, A Response to Commentators, in ETHICS WITHOUT GOD?:  THE 
DIVINE IN CONTEMPORARY MORAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 136, 139 (Fulvio Di Blasi et al. 
eds., 2008) (“Thomas [Aquinas] finally adopts Augustine’s position that there are only two 
[kinds of law]:  laws which proceed from the divine mind, and temporal laws which proceed 
from the human mind.  This comports with his position that the proper definition of a law is 
drawn from the active principle, which is a mind actively conceiving, judging, promulgating.  
Since Thomas rules out angels as sources of legislation, there can only be two—divine and 
human.  Incidentally, this is why Thomas has a very strong jurisprudential doctrine of 
‘original intent.’”).  On the positivity of law in Aquinas (and some of the problems it causes 
Aquinas’s account), see JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW:  
FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48–116 (2005) and PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL 
DUTY 23–25 (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2011). 
 42. Strang, supra note 3, at 2024 n.227. 
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participation, gives us the very definition of law:  “an ordinance of reason 
for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and 
promulgated.”43  In the case of the Constitution, those who had care of the 
community were the Framers and Ratifiers, as Strang himself 
acknowledges.44  What justification can Strang provide, then, for 
systematically ignoring what they intended?  I fail to see how our forebears 
could bind themselves or those who would come later to a message in a 
bottle that merely floats through time.45
This brings me to a second objection to the originalism Strang defends, 
and here I shall be brief because this point is prelude to the objection to 
which I turn in Part III.  Strang has recently argued, with the obligatory 
citation to Russell Kirk’s The Conservative Constitution, that “conservative 
legal thought” leads to originalism “because both have the purpose to 
preserve and instantiate traditional—social and legal—norms.”
  Law is mind ruling and measuring 
other mind. 
46  Strang 
continues in this vein:  “The America that created the Constitution is the 
standard of what is ‘traditional’ in the United States.”47  Among the morally 
relevant facts that this ipse dixit overlooks is the radical and revolutionary 
quality of the Constitution, both the ideas that led to it and what it in turn 
embodies.  Limitations of space allow no more than another obligatory 
citation, this one to Gordon Wood’s The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution.48
III.  MEN OF HIGHEST PRINCIPLE WHO “FORGOT” 
  My question is this:  What basis is there for allowing the 
Constitution to sever in perpetuity a people’s ties to the authentic and 
dynamic tradition of reflection on the natural law and the divine positive 
law?  Cut flowers wither and die. 
The big loser in the Constitution was—and remains—God.  He can take 
care of Himself, one might be tempted to retort.  The fact is, though, that He 
respectfully leaves it up to His rational creatures freely to seek and to find 
Him, or to defy Him and to lose Him.  The exclusion of God from the 
Constitution is almost universally celebrated today, especially that 
exclusion’s contribution to the much-vaunted “separation” between church 
 
 43. AQUINAS, supra note 23, at I–II, Q. 90, art. 4; see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, 
Law in a Catholic Framework, in TEACHING THE TRADITION:  CATHOLIC THEMES IN 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES 437, 444–47 (John J. Piderit, S.J. & Melanie M. Morey eds., 2012). 
 44. Strang, supra note 4, at 957–81. 
 45. Being ruled and measured by divine or human authority and law does not amount to 
forming a contract (even a “social contract”), which is part of why the “objective” 
interpretations favored in contract law are inapposite. See KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION:  PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 258–64 
(2010). 
 46. Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?:  Theoretical Possibilities 
and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 285 (2011).  It bears mention that 
the great defenders of liberalism, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Mill, appreciated something of 
the place of virtue in making and sustaining states. See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE 
MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1999). 
 47. Strang, supra note 46, at 286. 
 48. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1991). 
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and state.  Since 1789, religious practice has flourished in this country in 
many and varied ways, but not in others.  On balance, I count myself among 
the illiberal lamenters of the exclusion of God from the American plan of 
government.  Why lament what has favored so much religious practice?  To 
avoid the sin of defending—except as a remote second-best—a political 
regime that denies what is God’s by right:  the worship of the social body 
that is the state, not merely individual worship. 
I will not pause here to defend what I have just asserted about the divine 
right to social worship:  it was widely understood and frequently honored 
over much of the past two millennia, and indeed was anticipated by the best 
of Greek philosophy.49
Larry Solum, who (like Strang) is on the side of both originalism and a 
virtue-driven approach to constitutional interpretation, is surely correct in 
what follows:  “If you believe the words and phrases that make up the 
operative text of the Constitution of the United States are on the side of evil, 
then you should not be an originalist.”
  I postulate the traditional position here in order to 
focus the following question.  What is one who holds the traditional 
position to do about the Constitution’s exclusion of God and the possibility 
of worship by the state?  Strang’s thesis that virtue is on the side of an 
originalist understanding of the Godless Constitution invites this question.  
Granted that God demands social worship, what is the conscientious and 
honorable thing to do with respect to “our” Constitution that by deep design 
and on principle denies the divine right?  In sum, can virtue be on the side 
that designedly—and on principle—slights God? 
50  Not surprisingly, the evils Solum 
has in mind do not include the refusal to meet the divine right to social 
worship.  How should people who favor not only virtue but also the divine 
right view or treat our Constitution?  This is a question I have begun to 
answer elsewhere,51
When Alexander Hamilton was asked at the conclusion of the 
Constitutional Convention why the document contained no recognition of 
God or the Christian religion, he replied:  “I declare, we forgot it!”




  Not 
really.  Two cheers nonetheless, but not three. 
 
 49. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOKS VII AND VIII 1333–35 (Richard Kraut trans., 1997) 
(“The same things are best both individually, and collectively.”); see also HANS-GEORG 
GADAMER, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN PLATONIC-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY 53 (1986); 
2 JOSEPH HERGENRÖTHER, CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CHRISTIAN STATE:  A SERIES OF ESSAYS 
ON THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH TO THE CIVIL POWER 354–57 (London, Burns and Oates 
1876). 
 50. Solum, supra note 7, at 50. 
 51. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Mighty Work of Making Nations Happy:  A 
Response to James Davison Hunter, 39 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2013). 
 52. CHRISTOPHER A. FERRARA, LIBERTY, THE GOD THAT FAILED 510 (2012). 
